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MCCAIN V. GRANT PARISH POLICE JURY: JUDICIAL
USE OF THE INHERENT POWERS DOCTRINE TO
COMPEL ADEQUATE JUDICIAL FUNDING**
Introduction
No arm of government can operate effectively without adequate
funding, and budgetary battles are among the most hard-fought of all
political struggles. One branch of government, the judiciary, has no part
in the appropriation process, leaving it particularly susceptible to in-
sufficient funding. The inherent powers doctrine has been used by the
judiciary to redress this weakness and to compel necessary funding for
efficient operation. Some states have already adopted this concept,' which
has its origin in the notion of separation of powers. The separation of
powers doctrine requires that each branch be able to effectively assert
its distinct powers. A judicial flexing of muscle is dependent upon
adequate financing.
[T]he separation of powers doctrine, properly understood, im-
poses upon the judicial branch not merely a negative duty not
to interfere with the executive or legislative branches, but a
positive responsibility to perform its own job efficiently. This
positive aspect of separation of powers imposes on courts af-
* Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
** Subsequent to the completion of this note, the Louisana Supreme Court, in State
In The Interest of Johnson (No. 85-ck-0582, Sept. 10, 1985) acknowledged the existence
of an inherent judicial power, ostensibly for purposes of indigent representation. The
Department of Health and Human Resources had initiated proceedings in the Family
Court of East Baton Rouge Parish to declare a child abandoned, and an attorney was
appointed by the court to represent the indigent parent of the child. A dispute arose over
who was to pay the attorney's fees. The supreme court held that the "power to furnish
counsel for indigents necessarily includes the power, when reasonably necessary for effective
representation, to issue an order requiring the state, its appropriate subdivision, department,
or agency, to provide for the payment of counsel fees and necessary expenses." This
reasonableness standard is remarkably similar to the test as enunciated in McCain, although
surprisingly, McCain was not cited by he court as authority for its decision. Johnson is
therefore an example of explicit approval by the Louisiana Supreme Court of the appli-
cation of the inherent powers doctrine, although it may be argued that the holding in
Johnson is limited to the particular fact situation presented. Nonetheless, the close analogy
to the proper test for imposition of the inherent powers doctrine between this case and
McCain indicates judicial recognition of this doctrine and at least one concrete example
of a factual situation where use of this doctrine is appropriate to cover necessary expenses
in the operation of a court.
1. See generally, Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 569 (1974) and cases cited therein.
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firmative obligations to assert and fully exercise their powers,
to operate efficiently by modern standards, to protect their
independent status, and to fend off legislative or executive at-
tempts to encroach upon judicial prerogatives. From that re-
sponsibility arises an inherent power of courts to require that
they be reasonably financed.2
Louisiana has taken a step towards joining the ranks of her sister
states, most noticeably in McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury.3 This
note will explore the rationale behind the third circuit's opinion in McCain
and will examine the implications of this decision for the financial plight
of other constitutionally created bodies.
McCain v. Grant Parish Policy Jury
In McCain, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that
a district court has the inherent power to compel the Police Jury of
the parish in which it sits to appropriate the reasonably necessary ex-
penses for its own operation.
4
On February 4, 1982, the district court judge submitted to the Police
Jury a proposed budget of $11,400 covering four items: telephone serv-
ices, equipment maintenance, office supplies, and reference materials.
The Police Jury budgeted $2500. By June, the court's past due bills
alone exceeded the original allocation.' On June 3, the judge wrote to
the Police Jury explaining the expenses and enclosed the past due bills
for disposition. Four days later, having received no response from the
Police Jury, he filed suit against the Police Jury seeking writs of man-
damus requiring the payment of past due bills and reformation of the
budget. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the judge and
"ordered the Police Jury to immediately pay the reasonable expenses of
the district court which were then past due and to reform its budget to
provide the amounts specified in Judge McCain's [original] proposed
budget." 6
The court of appeal, after finding that the issue of whether the
judicial branch possesses the inherent power to compel necessary ap-
propriations was res nova in Louisiana, reviewed the basic concepts of
separation of powers in the Louisiana Constitution and looked to the
jurisprudence of other states for guidance.7 Actually, the Louisiana
2. J. Carrigan, Inherent Powers of the Courts 1-2 (1973) (emphasis added).
3. 440 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
4. Id. at 1372.
5. Id. at 1370. "Telephone (2 months), $418.63; Pitney Bowes (postage meter rental
and postage costs), $848.13; Price Office Supply (bookcases for Judge's office), $688;
West Publishing Company (Louisiana Revised Statutes and Civil Code updates), $351;
Lanier Business Products (courtroom recording equipment), $549.95."
6. Id. at 1371.
7. For a sampling of the common law, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d, supra note 1. A
particularly well-known case is that of Commonwealth ex rel Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa.
45, 274 A. 2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974, 91 S. Ct. 1665 (1971).
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Second Circuit Court of Appeal had faced a similar plea for recognition
of the judicial inherent powers doctrine in Lyons v. Bossier Parish Police
Jury.' In Lyons, the judge of the City Court of Bossier City sought to
compel the Bossier Parish Police Jury to pay its pro rata portion of
the amount necessary to increase the monthly salaries of the clerks and
deputy clerks of the court. The court granted relief but declined to
apply the doctrine of inherent powers. Instead, the second circuit panel
relied on a statutory provision mandating certain salary levels for clerks9
and held that "[flailure to pay the clerk the minimum amount set forth
in the statute is a breach of a ministerial duty for which mandamus
will lie to compel performance of that duty."' 0 The court recognized
that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy under the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure and, interpreting the language of the article strictly,"
decided that although "the judiciary undoubtedly has inherent power
to compel other branches of government to perform certain acts in
exceptional circumstances,' ' 2 inherent powers alone could not justify
imposition of the writ of mandamus in this case. The second circuit
was correct in refusing to recognize the inherent powers doctrine as a
justification for imposition of the writ. Since a statute mandated the
funding, any discussion of inherent powers would have been irrelevant.
The third circuit did not so decline in McCain:
Clearly, the courts of this state are established by our consti-
tution, as is the legislative branch, and have a right to exist.
If the legislative branch (Police Jury), being the only branch of
government with the ability to generate operating funds, refuses
to provide the necessary money for the operation of the courts,
the courts have only one avenue of relief available; i.e., a suit
to force the fulfillment of a ministerial duty, mandamus.' 3
The court anchored its decision in the principle of separation of powers."'
Although the court chose the correct theoretical basis for the inherent
powers doctrine, it failed to reconcile the inconsistency of applying the
doctrine to branches of government which are not, strictly speaking, co-
equal. As the court noted, 5 article 1I, section 1 of the Louisiana Con-
8. 262 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
9. La. R.S. 13:1888 (1983).
10. 262 So. 2d at 840.
11. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3863.
12. 262 So. 2d at 840.
13. 262 So. 2d at 1373.
14. Id. at 1371. "The Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court .. .was created pursuant
to Article V of the Louisiana Constitution. As such, it stands on an independent and
equal footing with the Grant Parish Police Jury."
15. Id.
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stitution divides the exercise of power of government into the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. Article V, section 1 vests the judicial
power in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other
courts authorized by the article. Thus, a district court is an arm of state
government. A police jury, however, is not an arm of state government.
Instead, it is an arm of parish government, created by the state legislature.
Therefore, the district court and the police jury are not equal branches
of the parish government. A further anomaly exists. If a separation of
powers discussion hinges upon the existence of three distinct, co-equal
branches of government, each prohibited from exercising power belong-
ing to either of the other two, then the court cannot justify imposition
of the inherent powers doctrine (theoretically dependent upon separation
of powers), since on a parish level two of the local branches of govern-
ment, the executive and legislative, are combined into one governmental
unit, a police jury. The court could have avoided these problems by
grounding its inherent powers analysis upon a theory of "right to life"
rather than in separation of powers. As the court pointed out, the right
of the district court to exist "cannot be, and has not been questioned." 1
6
Since existence depends upon adequate funding, no further justification
is needed and the court may now simply exploit the police jury's suscep-
tibility to a judicial directive compelling funding.
While there are several constitutional articles designed to safegard
the fiscal authority of the state legislature to appropriate state funds, 7
the protection afforded by these provisions does not inure to the benefit
of a local police jury. This may well explain why the suit in McCain
was brought against the Police Jury and not against the Louisiana
legislature. 8 Ironically, the only specific constitutional protection af-
forded local governmental units against outside interference with their
appropriation power is directed against the legislature and not against
the district court. 9 The battle between police jury and district court is
16. Id.
17. La. Const. art III, § 16; La. Const. art VII, § 10(A); La. Code Civ. P. art.
3862.
18. Inherent powers lawsuits may be more successful at the local rather than the
state level-that is, courts may win a higher proportion of suits against local
authorities, and the suits will have a more persuasive effect on local budget
officials. This may be a question of power. It may be more difficult for a
court to issue a writ of mandamus against a co-partner-a state legislature or
state executive official. C. Baar, Separate but Subservient-Court Budgeting in
the American States 148 (1975).
19. La. Const. art VI, § 14 provides:
No law requiring increased expenditures for wages, hours, working conditions,
pension and retirement benefits, vacation, or sick leave benefits of political
subdivision employees . . . shall become effective until approved by ordinance
enacted by the governing authority of the affected political subdivision or until
the legislature appropriates funds for the purpose to the affected political sub-
division and only to the extent and amount that such funds are provided.
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not between equals. The law, and the advantage which accompanies the
power to interpret the law, rests with the court. Regardless of which
theoretical justification for use of the inherent powers doctrine is used,
(whether it be separation of powers or a "right to life" approach),
several arguments can be made against the use of this funding device.
One criticism of inherent powers is that use of the doctrine is inherently
biased. The threshold question, whether the court is being funded at a
level sufficient to allow it to perform its constitutionally mandated
functions, has already been judicially determined by the mere fact that
the judge decided to bring the suit. Furthermore, although the judge
trying such a case would not be from the same district court as that
which filed the suit, presumably any trial judge would be sympathetic
to a brother court's financial plight. Finally, although the test for
triggering the mandamus remedy is couched in terms of "reasonably
necessary" expenses,2 0 a problem lies in the unbiased application of the
test itself in that another district judge is quite likely to give the test
a broad construction.
The very doctrine that forms the basis of the inherent power of the
courts also creates the disturbing problem of how a police jury is to check
abuse of the doctrine by adducing evidence in its defense in an inherent
powers suits. Since a police jury has no expertise in the determination
of "reasonably necessary" expenses for the operation of a district court,
it would have to depend upon the expert testimony of other, probably
unsympathetic, judges for its rebuttal. Again, such a situation places the
court at a distinct advantage. Furthermore, the doctrine should not limit
scrutiny to the necessity of the expenditures in question. Rather, review
should be expanded to consider the reasonableness of the expenditures
in light of the court's possible fiscal irresponsibility in depleting monies
available from other sources such as the Judicial Expense Fund.
Judge Domengeaux, in his McCain concurrence, hints at another
critisism: the tension between inherent powers and the prohibition against
deficit spending. "We express no opinion as to any exigency which
might place a police jury into a deficit situation by paying such district
court expenses. Such a contingency would entail possible conflicting
constitutional provisions which we obviously do not consider here."'"
In a hypothetical situation in which the police jury would deliberately
underfund the court and budget all of the remaining money, a court
would then have to re-adjust much of the parish budget, deciding which
expenditures in other departments were necessary. Obviously, a court is
simply not equipped to perform the political function of re-writing a
budget, traditionally a legislative duty.
Not only are police juries underprotected from judicial budgetary
intervention, they are also subject to the perils of small budget variability.
20. 440 So. 2d at 1372.
21. Id. at 1373 (Domengeaux, J., concurring).
19851
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For example, suppose that the district court held an unusually expensive
capital trial which required the court to petition the police jury for
additional funds. On a state level, the chances are higher that such a
contingency would be counterbalanced by a surplus in another depart-
ment or agency. But the size of a police jury budget precludes much
hope of such an occurrence, thereby increasing the chances a judicial
raid on the police jury's budget would cause severe budgetary hardship.
These criticisms of the inherent powers doctrine point to the danger
of losing the distinction between the judicial and political process. Use
of a judicial mechanism to increase political power would decrease
intergovernmental harmony. Just because a court has lost a political
budget fight does not mean that a judicial solution should be imposed.
Availability of an easy judicial remedy may decrease the possibility of
a political solution, at least on the local level, by removing much of
the incentive for the judiciary to seek a political accomodation with the
police jury. On the other hand, availability of judicial recourse may
prompt the legislature to specify statutorily, exactly what the police jury
must furnish the courts. In any case, unless the limited availability of
the inherent powers doctrine is made clear, McCain's "spirit of mutual
cooperation" will remain no more than empty rhetoric.
The inherent powers doctrine, theoretically difficult to enforce on
a state level because of the legislature's constitutional protection against
interference with its exclusive appropriation power, may nonetheless be
an effective tool for the judiciary on a local level. Its necessity can be
premised upon the judiciary's exclusion from the appropriation process.
[Tihe judiciary is the only one of the three branches of gov-
ernment that has no role in the governmental budget process.
It cannot, like a legislature, appropriate public money. It cannot,
like a governor, veto an appropriation of public money. It does
have a specialized, unwritten, and limited inherent power to
appropriate funds for itself by judicial decree. Courts may go
to court, and courts have gone to court, to secure orders re-
quiring the expenditure of public money reasonably necessary
for the effective operation of the judicial branch of government.22
In fact, acknowledgement of the inherent powers doctrine may encourage
adequate funding through the political process alone. If a police jury knew
that a judicial solution would likely be imposed if a court were inade-
quately funded, then presumably it would forgo the inevitable and accept
the court's own determination of its necessary level of funding.
Furthermore, the inherent powers doctrine is intended to be limited in
scope. The third circuit tempered its holding in McCain by adopting a
22. C. Baar, supra note 18, at 143.
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common theme in the relevant jurisprudence, namely: "although the
power which exists in the courts is inherent, it is not unlimited; rather
it extends to expenses which are reasonably necessary to the functioning
and administration of the court and must be exercised in the spirit of
mutual cooperation among the various branches of government." 3 This
language indicates that the burden of proving the necessity of the ex-
penditures in question lies with the judiciary. Judge McCain sustained
his burden of proving that the expenses incurred were reasonable and
necessary by relying heavily upon testimony from two other district court
judges.2 The Police Jury, on the other hand, did not avail itself of its
opportunity to rebut plaintiff's testimony, choosing instead to do noth-
ing.
Regardless of the doctrine's problems, two other courts have been
quick to follow the lead of McCain. In City Court of Breaux Bridge
v. Town of Breaux Bridge, 25 another third circuit panel applied the
reasoning in McCain to justify the use of mandamus by the city court
to force the governing authority of the town "to pay all reasonable
unpaid expenses for the operation of the City Court of Breaux Bridge." 2 6
McCain's doctrine has even been applied in another kind of suit. State
v. Lembcke2' involved an appeal in a criminal case that was remanded
for failure to individualize sentencing. 28
In an apparent defense of his actions, the trial judge stated that
he did not have the staff to supervise any alternative to a jail
sentence. Any shortcomings in the staffing of a court to the
extent that a court is not staffed at a reasonably necessary level
to perform its constitutional duty can be cured by the court.2 9
This language may indicate the ease with which the inherent powers
weapon will be incorporated into the judical armory. Recognition of the
power is one thing, but the implicit encouragement in Lembcke to seek
relief by this method will do little to foster intergovernmental harmony.
Assuming complete judicial acceptance of the inherent powers doctrine,
is there any room for expansion to afford protection for other consti-
23. 440 So. 2d at 1372.
24. Id. at 1373.
25. 440 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 So. 2d 1219 (La.
1984).
26. Id. at 1376-77, detailing the expenses "to include, although not by way of
limitation, expenses for postage and mailing, printing of necessary forms, telephone costs,
and upkeep and maintenance of the law library of the City Court of Breaux Bridge and
other reasonable operating expenses germane to the operation of that court."
27. 444 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
28. The trial judge had sentenced Lembcke to an automatic 10-day jail term in
violation of Article 894.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
29. Id. at 354 (emphasis added). The court cited McCain as authority for this
statement.
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tutional bodies? Pennsylvania's Justice Jones' concurrence in Com-
monwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate,3" relied upon as authority in McCain,
forsaw the possible repercussions that recognition of the inherent powers
concept may produce.
If this Court holds that funds must be afforded the Judiciary
if "reasonably necessary," could a future majority, while stress-
ing the fundamental co-equality of all three branches of gov-
ernment, logically deny this same standard to the Executive
branch of government (the Legislative branch alreadv controllin,
the power of the purse?) 3'
Louisiana courts have not yet directly addressed the issue of whether in-
herent powers is exclusively a remedy for insufficient judicial funding.
But the recent decision of the first circuit in Freeman v. Treen" suggests
that just such a determination will eventually be required of a Louisiana
court.
In Freeman, the Lieutenant Governor persuaded the Senate Finance
Committee to increase the salaries continuing item in the budget for his
office by $133,637. The Governor vetoed the entire item. The Lieutenant
Governor sued to have the veto declared to be and permanently enjoined
as unconstitutional, alleging that without a specific and irrevocable ap-
propriation of funds for salaries, "he is without sufficient funds to
perform his constitutional functions as Lieutenant Governor." 33 Never-
theless, Freeman testified that he had continued to perform his duties,
mainly through a reduction of his staff and use of a fund transfer
system that allowed him to funnel money from his operating budget to
provide for his staff's salary needs. The court found that these facts
did not prove that the Lieutenant Governor was without sufficient funds
to carry out his constitutional duties nor did they prove the abolition
of his office by an unconstitutionally exercised veto.3 4
Freeman cited the case of Board of Elementary & Secondary Ed-
ucation v. Nix 11 to buttress his contention that Treen's veto "deprived
him of any means by which to retain the staff of his own choosing,
with resulting irreparable harm. 3 6 Indeed, an examination of the ian-
30. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974, 91 S. Ct. 1665 (1971).
31. Id. at 58, 274 A.2d at 204.
32. 442 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
33. Id. at 761.
34. Id. at 762.
35. 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
36. 442 So. 2d at 762. The court's interpretation of the holding in Nix is as follows:
In Nix, the Louisiana Supreme Court held unconstitutional the repeal of a
certain statute which had allowed the Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education to employ and fix the salaries of staff 'necessary' to assist the board
in administering its affairs. The court said the repeal had the effect of requiring
the board to rely upon staff services and personnel selected and employed by
the Superintendent of Education, and therefore unconstitutionally infringed upon
the board's constitutionally conferred policy-making functions. Id., n.5.
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guage in Nix uncovers several statements by the Louisiana Supreme
Court that, at first glance, seem to strengthen Freeman's position. The
most powerful of these was the statement that "[tihe legislature cannot
deprive a constitutional agency of its ability to perform its constitutional
function by depriving it of the means to do so."" However, the court
chose to temper the impact of this declaration by adding:
[W]e [do not] mean to imply that the board may unilaterally
determine what employees are necessary for its performance of
its constitutional function. The legislature, of course, itself has
a constitutional power to pass upon requests of state agencies
for funding of requested staff, as well as to make appropriation
for them or refuse to do so. 8
The Louisiana Constitution contains a number of provisions that seem
to restrict the usual legislative discretion over the budget and instead
mandate funding at some minimum level necessary for implementation
of the intent of the particular article. The articles cover appropriations
in at least four instances: counsel for indigents,39 establishment of a
minimum program of education, 40 operation of the state boards of
education4 ' and civil service commissions.4 2 But as Professor Lee Har-
grave, coordinator of legal research of the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973, notes, these provisions are horatory and without
binding effect.
The Louisiana Constitution contains a number of mandates to
the legislature even though it was known by the delegates that
such provisions are not self-enforcing and that no mechanism
exists to force the legislature to comply with a mandate. Often,
such mandates resulted when proponents of some policy were
unable to garner the votes necessary to adopt an enforceable
rule; they compromised on a mandate which they saw as a
psychological aid for their position or which might be of political
aid to their view in the future. Such was the background of
the provision, "The legislature shall provide for a uniform system
for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents."
The provision has no practical effect, as the supreme court has
recognized, in terms of judicial enforcement without legislation.""
The weakness of these so-called mandates lies in the constitu-
37. 347 So. 2d at 155.
38. Id. at 156.
39. La. Const. art. 1, § 13.
40. La. Const. art. ViII, § 11.
41. Id.
42. La. Const. art. X, § 13.
43. Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-77 Term-
Louisiana Constitutional Law, 38 La. L. Rev. 438, 441-42 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
19851
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tional rule that there can be no expenditure of state funds without a
legislative appropriation. Although the constitution may say that appropria-
tions shall be made, it also leaves the power to do so in the hands of
the legislature. Abuse of legislative discretion to dictate exactly "how much
is enough" leads to a possible consideration of the inherent powers doc-
trine but, without enforceable constitutional or statutory language, the
chances of a successful breach of the legislature's powers of the purse
are nonexistent.
Arguably, bodies which the constitution creates but for which it does
not, by its terms, mandate funding, more closely fit the judicial inherent
powers mold. "Inherent judicial powers derive not from legislative grant
or specific constitutional provision, but from the fact that it is a court
which has been created, and to be a court requires certain incidental
powers in the nature of things," 44 among them the right to compel
adequate funding. The key to the distinction between these bodies and
those for which funding is mandated is the justification for imposition
of the writs of mandamus compelling the expenditure of funds. In a
true inherent powers scheme, one does not look for constitutional lan-
guage mandating funding because none exists. The power is inherent
because there is no governing constitutional provision regarding funding.
Use of the inherent powers doctrine under these limited circumstances
by other constitutionally created bodies is free from the threat of bias.
The forum court would retain the detachment and objectivity difficult
to guarantee under McCain. Additionally, because the arbiter of the
proceedings is not also one of the participants, the rest of the McCain
criticism loses much of its support in logic.
Nonetheless, the court in Freeman chose to concentrate only on the
procedural question of whether injunctive relief should be granted:
Serious constitutional questions are raised by this controversy:
What is the precise amount of money which must be appro-
priated to the Lieutenant Governor in order to provide him with
the practical and effective means for fulfilling his constitutional
duties? What is the minimum number of staff employees that
a Lieutenant Governor must have to carry out those duties?
When may the Governor validly exercise his veto power over
such appropriations without disabling the Office of Lieutenant
Governor? To the extent these questions are justiciable, they are
better answered in ordinary proceedings after a full trial on the
merits. 5
Yet the court addressed these same issues by implication when it refused
to grant the permanent injunction because the test of whether Freeman's
44. J. Carrigan, supra note 2, at 2.
45. 442 So. 2d at 764.
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office was "without sufficient operating funds to perform his constitu-
tional functions" 6 is in fact no different from the "reasonably necessary"
standard of review as articulated in McCain. Both tests focus on whether
there is sufficient funding to guarantee effective and efficient operation
as measured by constitutional mandate.
The factual circumstances in McCain distinguish it from Freeman. The
McCain court was successful because two factors mitigated in its favor.
The first was that the suit was directed against a non co-equal branch
of government, thus making it easier to enforce the court's will. Sec-
ondly, the district court's jurisdictional grant47 provides a much better
argument for the necessity of adequate funding than the Lieutenant
Governor's paltry grant of constitutionally delineated power.
48
Conclusion
Does the McCain decision mean that the inherent powers doctrine
is available to all? Probably not. Such an extraordinary remedy should
not be given broad approval without some specific indication from the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The very doctrine that spawns the existence
of inherent powers also dictates its limited use. Remember that only
the judicial branch is excluded by design from the checks and balances
of the appropriation process. By virtue of this design, the judiciary
should be able to avail itself of the doctrine under carefully articulated
circumstances due to the ever present threat of bias and political ma-
nipulation of a judicial remedy. Any extension of the doctrine to cover
other constitutionally created bodies should be undertaken with extreme
caution. The warning is clear. Although the power to compel funding
exists, it is not absolute, "rather it extends to expenses which are
reasonably necessary . . . and must be exercised in the spirit of mutual
cooperation among the various branches of government." 49 Furthermore,
unless the granting of power to constitutionally created bodies is held
to be unaffected by legislative discretion; specific enough to support the
need for additional funding; and strong enough to override the legis-
lature's power of the purse, any application of the inherent powers
doctrine will probably be limited to the facts as presented in McCain.
A ndri Doguet
46. Id. at 761.
47. La. Const. art. V, § 16.
48. La. Const. art. IV, § 6.
49. 440 So. 2d at 1372.
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